OpenCode Says Provider Keys Saved in Console Workspaces "May Have Been Exposed". Rotate Them Now
- What happened
- According to two outlets quoting its email, OpenCode told Console users on 17 October that third party provider keys saved in their workspaces may have been exposed through a breached legacy system.
- Why it matters
- A leaked OpenAI, Anthropic or Google key bills its owner for whatever an attacker runs on it, and OpenCode, as quoted by dev.to, says the incident is ongoing.
- What to do
- If you ever saved a provider key in an OpenCode Console workspace, revoke it in that provider's dashboard, issue a new one and check usage since 16 October.
Our take: if you ever saved an OpenAI, Anthropic or Google key in an OpenCode Console workspace, rotate it today. Rotation costs minutes; a leaked key bills you for every call an attacker makes. Our OpenCode verdict stays conditional, and trust is exactly the condition.
One caveat on everything below: we could not read OpenCode's own statements directly, so every OpenCode quote here comes as reported by two outlets, dev.to (17 October) and Startup Fortune (18 October).
What happened
According to dev.to, OpenCode emailed affected Console users on 17 October. dev.to quotes the email, and Startup Fortune quotes the same notice from other reports:
- "We identified unauthorized access to a legacy system that we were in the process of decommissioning."
- "Third party provider keys (eg OpenAI, Anthropic) saved in your workspace may have been exposed."
dev.to also quotes an OpenCode post on X from 18:08 UTC that day:
- "We had a security breach last night related to a large scale distillation attack."
- "The incident is ongoing so we cannot share more details at this point."
| Detail | As reported |
|---|---|
| Who is affected | 1.4% of Console users, those with external provider keys stored in a workspace |
| What was exposed | Third party provider keys saved in workspaces |
| Other data | Startup Fortune: OpenCode's investigation "to date" found no evidence other data leaked |
| Notification | dev.to: OpenCode says it emailed every affected user, and users it did not contact were not impacted |
OpenCode's advice, as quoted by dev.to: "revoke and replace those keys through the relevant provider's dashboard, update any applications using them, and review recent usage for unexpected activity."
Why it matters
A provider key is a billing credential. Whoever holds it runs calls on your account, and Startup Fortune cites a report that some affected users saw bills "climbing into the hundreds of dollars" from queries they did not make. That is a secondhand report, not a figure OpenCode has confirmed.
Several things are still unknown:
- Scope. OpenCode has given a percentage, not an account count.
- Cause. It has not said how the attacker got in or how long access lasted.
- "Distillation attack." That is OpenCode's label. Distillation means training one model on another model's answers, and dev.to suggests stolen keys gave an attacker free output for that. OpenCode has not confirmed this or said how the label explains the access.
Console, not the CLI
The reported exposure concerns keys saved in hosted OpenCode Console workspaces. dev.to notes that keys added to the open-source CLI with /connect are stored locally in ~/.local/share/opencode/auth.json. OpenCode has said nothing about local keys either way.
Why we keep OpenCode at conditional
We rate OpenCode conditional because it asks for trust: patch fast and isolate it. A reported breach in its hosted layer is the risk that verdict describes, not a new one. We will revisit if OpenCode publishes an incident report with scope and cause.
What changes for you
- Revoke and reissue. If you saved any provider key in an OpenCode Console workspace, revoke it in that provider's own dashboard (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google) and issue a new one. Do it even if no email reached you: rotation is cheap.
- Update consumers. Replace the old key in every application and Console workspace secret that used it.
- Check usage. Review the provider's usage logs from 16 October onward (OpenCode's post, as quoted by dev.to, dated the breach to the night before 17 October) for calls you did not make.
- Consider local keys. Rotate keys in
auth.jsontoo if the machine is shared or synced.
FAQ
Is the OpenCode CLI affected? OpenCode's statements, as quoted, cover Console workspace keys only. Local CLI keys were not mentioned.
I got no email. Am I safe? OpenCode says it emailed every affected user. If you ever stored a key in a Console workspace, rotating anyway costs minutes.
What to do
- 1 If you saved any provider key in an OpenCode Console workspace, revoke it in the provider's own dashboard (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google) and issue a new one, even if no email reached you.
- 2 Update every application and Console workspace secret that used the old key, then review the provider's usage logs from 16 October onward for calls you did not make.
- 3 Keys added to the local CLI with /connect sit in ~/.local/share/opencode/auth.json, and OpenCode has said nothing about them. Rotate those too if the machine is shared or synced.
Affected tools & models
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